Stephen Law on moral relativism

[Lord Muck oGentry]

I liked this piece by Stephen Law:
http://stephenlaw.blogspot.com/search/l ... relativism

He not only explains what is wrong with moral relativism but also makes the useful point that it offers a convenient stick for authoritarians to beat their opponents with. He goes on to explain what is wrong with the authoritarian argument.

[Alan H]

I've not read that bit of his blog yet, but it sounds very like what he says in his book The war for children's minds. Well worth reading.

[Zoe]

Thanks for the link. I'm definitely going to buy his book. I still struggle a lot with the whole relative/absolute morality thing. I mean, while I believe that some things are always wrong, I don't understand how we can state categorically that they are always wrong. If I believed in God then it would be easy to say something is wrong because God says so but as I don't, where does my belief that some things are always wrong come from?

[Lord Muck oGentry]

Zoe,

First, an apology. I should have made it plain that Law spends far more time in the article attacking lazy strawman accusations of moral relativism than attacking relativism itself. And the version that he attacks is, as he acknowledges, of a crude well-it's-true-for-me sort.

Still, it'll do for the moment. Let's suppose Smith says that killing people is wrong, but Jones mentions self-defence, and Robinson chips in with defence of innocent third parties. Smith may accept these counter-examples and modify his view, or he may reject them, as some pacifists do, and stick to his maxim. But if he takes the line that it's still true-for-him ( although false-for-others) that killing is wrong, he has in fact abandoned his original view— which, as Jones and Robinson rightly assumed at the outset, was meant to apply to everyone. And if Smith goes on to argue that all moral assertions carry an implicit relativist rider, he has managed to make moral disagreement impossible. Since moral disagreement is not only possible but common as muck, relativism is a hopelessly bad account of moral discourse.

As fo the question you raise, I wonder whether it may not be more than one question. If we're looking for absolute moral principles that admit of no exception or qualification, they may be hard to come by. And even when we think we've found one, some awkward devil may think of an exception to our rule. In that respect, moral thinking is much like factual thinking: we are fallible, but must make do with the best beliefs we can get. The same goes for the question how we can be sure that our beliefs are true: we can't, but we can try to get them right. I don't think, by the way, that religious belief is a help here even to those who have it. After all, " Because God says so" just invites the question " What is it about God's say-so that makes it right?"

[Parapraxis]

Generally, I would regard myself as a relativist, not just morally. However I do accept that sometimes objectivism is more appropriate and certainly more valid. For example, whilst a insignificant number of people may feel that murder is justified in certain circumstances, I would presume that for the vast majority of people, cross-culturally and globally, murder is wrong.

I tried to read all the posts that were tagged as moral relativism, but I had some issues with some of things that were written particularly with his initial post written just over a year ago.

He makes the important point that "we" "can sign up to all this liberal stuff without signing up to moral relativism". Conversely, some people sign up to less liberal stuff and probably equally promote moral objectivism. Take for example, the Catholic Church, who objectively preach that homosexuality is wrong (or that at least sex between two people of the same sex is wrong).

Law makes the curious statement that only those who reject relativism can condemn the intolerance of others, and I'm truly thankful that the Catholic Church who, of course, present an objective morality have never, and still do not, preach intolerance of others. [/sarcasm]

Law uses fairly weak hypothetical and anecdotal evidence. First, that every relativist is going to say the term "Don't judge". I have personally felt, and said, for quite a while that humans judge it is "part of our nature" if you will, the important thing to consider (I feel) is not whether we judge or do not judge, but whether we make reasoned judgements and come to reasoned and valid conclusions. Secondly that relativists are going to to apply their logic/morality/stance inconsistently, and whilst I would not refute that some do, I would equally doubt that all do.

My definition of (moral) relativism is not congruent with the moral relativism that Law presents as part of his argument. To me (at least), relativism is not about toleratiing every possible idea or moral stance, but it is at least recognising that there are other viewpoints. To take Law's example of female-circumcision, whilst I can recognise that in certain cultures it is not only accepted but commonplace, that does not mean to say as a relativist I accept it as a "correct" or "just" practice.

In practice, it is about holding for views strongly whether moral, political or otherwise, but accepting there are other viewpoints, and equally being tolerant to (at least well reasoned and valid) points of view. That to me is what encourages tolerance, freethought and decent debate.

(Apologies if I am referring to the incorrect blogpost, but the tag was linked not a specific post so I just went to the earliest post and read from there)

[Lord Muck oGentry]

Thanks for the thoughts, Electric Angel.

I'm not sure whether you really count as a moral relativist. To my eye, you look more like a man who is ready to argue his moral case, without assuming that he is infallibly in the right and has nothing to learn from opposing views. And that is entirely compatible with rejecting MR as I understand it. However, there are different definitions of moral relativism. Some can be found here:
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-relativism/


As for Law's point about relativism and tolerance: I think he is saying that a wrong-for-us-but-all-right-for-them relativist has no real defence against a determinedly intolerant opposition. After all, if they insist that intolerance is the right thing, then, on the relativist's own view, it is right-for-them.

[Zoe]

Thank you for your comments, LMoG and EA. A few thoughts:

My definition of (moral) relativism is not congruent with the moral relativism that Law presents as part of his argument.

Does this mean that Law's definition may be true for him but not for you? How am I supposed to know which is the true definition? FWIW, this is from wikipedia's page on moral relativism.

>>Moral relativists hold that no universal standard exists by which to access an ethical proposition's truth; moral subjectivism is thus the opposite of moral absolutism. Relativistic positions often see moral values as applicable only within certain cultural boundaries (cultural relativism) or in the context of individual preferences (moral subjectivism). An extreme relativist position might suggest that judging the moral or ethical judgments or acts of another person or group has no meaning, though most relativists propound a more limited version of the theory.<<

To take Law's example of female-circumcision, whilst I can recognise that in certain cultures it is not only accepted but commonplace, that does not mean to say as a relativist I accept it as a "correct" or "just" practice.

As a practice which can only be harmful and never bring any kind of benefit, female circumcision fits my criterion as something which is always and in every case wrong. Aren't things which are always harmful or hurtful - acts like female circumcision, rape and child abuse - always wrong and, if so, doesn't this make it an objective moral principle?

Killing somebody for no other reason than you don't like the look of them could be defined as an act which is only harmful. It brings no benefit of any sort and therefore is wrong. Killing somebody who is firing randomly into a crowd of people maybe the only way to save lives, therefore the act would have some benefit and is not necessarily wrong. I understand that this may be seen as taking a relativist position but it seems to me that the same criteria are used to decide whether something is right or wrong, regardless of the who, the what and the where, and those criteria are the achievement of human survival and happiness. This would seem to point to an objective morality.

In practice, it is about holding for views strongly whether moral, political or otherwise, but accepting there are other viewpoints, and equally being tolerant to (at least well reasoned and valid) points of view. That to me is what encourages tolerance, freethought and decent debate.

Is that actually what moral relativism is about? I would hope that your quote would describe me. I can certainly accept that there are other viewpoints and be tolerant about them if they are "at least well reasoned and valid". But I don't think this precludes the possibility of there being a universal standard of right and wrong.

Law makes the curious statement that only those who reject relativism can condemn the intolerance of others, and I'm truly thankful that the Catholic Church who, of course, present an objective morality have never, and still do not, preach intolerance of others.[/sarcasm]

I'm not sure that the morality that the Catholic Church presents is objective. I know that it is absolute but is that exactly the same as objective?

Is Law arguing that if you are a moral relativist, you should accept the right of others to be intolerant because that may be the right decision for them? That sounds about right to me. I don't see how the fact that the Catholic Church presents an absolute morality while at the same time being intolerant undermines this point.

Sorry if that all seems a bit muddled.

[Parapraxis]

Here is what I was originally going to post, and just after it is what I've added after Zoe made her post and I was told to review:
Perhaps I did not entirely understand the idea of moral relativism. So to try and give myself a basic grasp, I went to the greatest fountain of irrefutable knowledge on the planet...yes I looked up the Wikipedia article. According to the Wikipedia article, I would perhaps be more compatible as a moral pluralist.

Whilst I accept that cross-culturally, pan-nationally and individually, there will be discrepancy and inconsistency, and hence relativism. However I would reject that just because a view is held by a person, country, political system etc. that it is "Right for them", or as I have heard it referred it "If they believe it, it's true for them"; just because a view is held just not make it a justified view or a valid view. Having said that, these views will be at least "right" in the minds of those who hold them.

I also reject any notion of objective morality, because I doubt that there is one moral statement that would be universally agreed to; however I would suggest there are some moral values that are so uncommon and rare, that their validity, significance may not even bear thinking about - but the opposite would then not be an objective moral, it would be a moral enforced or held by the majority.

One of the largest reasons I reject absolute morality, is because some of the organisations "offer" an objective morality, offer morality that seems to be irrational, illogical and senseless. Sorry to go back to my previous example, but the Catholic Church's "objective morality" on sex - without going into too much detail, the Church cannot present a valid argument for their sexual morality based on reason, and instead have to resort to circular arguments involving the bible. However this is perhaps not so much an issue as to whether a moral value is relative or objective, but whether it is well-reasoned and "just".

Somebody with a philosophy/ethics degree help me out...am I a moral pluralist?

And here after the "review":

As a practice which can only be harmful and never bring any kind of benefit, female circumcision fits my criterion as something which is always and in every case wrong. Aren't things which are always harmful or hurtful - acts like female circumcision, rape and child abuse - always wrong and, if so, doesn't this make it an objective moral principle?

I'm going to be a pain in the arse and say it depends. I would suggest it's objective in the sense that it's harmful, and as far as I'm aware provides no tangible benefits that "outweigh" this harm. But clearly it is not objective in that some people practice it and regard it as important and just. So I suppose it depends where our frame of reference for objectivity comes from.

Apologies if none of this made sense, it's a bit poorly organised.

[Lord Muck oGentry]

Is Law arguing that if you are a moral relativist, you should accept the right of others to be intolerant because that may be the right decision for them? That sounds about right to me.

Well, it depends on whether " should" is meant morally or logically.

Given Law's obvious views, I don't think he means it morally. I'm with him there.

IMO he means that the moral relativist has deprived himself of the vocabulary in which to condemn intolerance in a full-blooded way. At best, the MR can say that intolerance is wrong-for-him. He can't say that it is wrong-for-the-intolerant. The rest of us can ( because we routinely do) say exactly that.

If that sounds confused, please don't blame Law or me. Blame MR.

[Jem]

I also reject any notion of objective morality, because I doubt that there is one moral statement that would be universally agreed to; however I would suggest there are some moral values that are so uncommon and rare, that their validity, significance may not even bear thinking about - but the opposite would then not be an objective moral, it would be a moral enforced or held by the majority.

EA, I see a problem with what you are saying here. Your premise is that objective morality depends on universal agreement and as there is unlikely to be universal agreement about anything, objective morality cannot exist. I think the premise is false. The reason why it is referred to as objective morality is because it refers to the belief that certain acts are wrong, regardless of human opinion.

[Parapraxis]

I also reject any notion of objective morality, because I doubt that there is one moral statement that would be universally agreed to; however I would suggest there are some moral values that are so uncommon and rare, that their validity, significance may not even bear thinking about - but the opposite would then not be an objective moral, it would be a moral enforced or held by the majority.

EA, I see a problem with what you are saying here. Your premise is that objective morality depends on universal agreement and as there is unlikely to be universal agreement about anything, objective morality cannot exist. I think the premise is false. The reason why it is referred to as objective morality is because it refers to the belief that certain acts are wrong, regardless of human opinion.

In which case I have simply misunderstood what is meant by "objective" here. I certainly agree there are acts which are wrong regardless of opinion. However, where can moral objectivity come from or how can it be reasoned, who (or what) is to say what is objectively immoral?

[Maria Mac]

The Case for Objective Morality by Francois Tremblay is worth a look.

There is also the thread Curtains started, Where morality comes from. It may be worth merging it with this one.

[Lord Muck oGentry]

The Case for Objective Morality by Francois Tremblay is worth a look.

There is also the thread Curtains started, Where morality comes from. It may be worth merging it with this one.

Maria,

It may be a good idea to merge the threads. And, in any case, it's for you to say.
But, before you do, I'd like to ask those who have posted whether the origins of morality cast much light on the grounds of morality.

[Zoe]

I'd like to ask those who have posted whether the origins of morality cast much light on the grounds of morality.

Very thought provoking question. I guess not.

[Lord Muck oGentry]

I'd like to ask those who have posted whether the origins of morality cast much light on the grounds of morality.

Very thought provoking question. I guess not.

Thanks, Zoe. We're agreed on that. I should just add that bringing the origins of morality into the context of justification looks like an example of the Genetic Fallacy:
http://www.fallacyfiles.org/genefall.html